Dependence Transformed into Leverage

The most telling defense industrial case right now comes down to two metals: dysprosium and terbium. China controls virtually all of their global processing. In April 2025, Beijing introduced restrictions on seven categories of medium and heavy rare earths, and Western manufacturers discovered what delays, licenses and uncertainty mean for materials that had previously circulated without friction.

The American response is unusual. The Army signed a term sheet with REalloys providing for a potential 75-year lease (50 years, plus a 25-year extension) on roughly 200 acres of the Tooele depot in Utah. The land remains public. The company finances, builds and operates, and the Army obtains a right of first offer on production without any purchase obligation. Add to that a deadline: from January 1, 2027, expanded federal restrictions on rare earth magnets and their supply chains will apply, forcing defense contractors to find compliant sources.

The causal chain is legible. A Chinese export restriction creates risk for weapons programs, the sourcing rule sets a hard deadline, and the state puts its land at the service of a private producer to fill the gap. The manufacturers concerned are among the most exposed: Lockheed Martin for the F-35, RTX for its radars and air defense systems, Northrop Grumman for the B-21, General Dynamics for its submarines.

Europe Applies the Same Logic, Including to Its Partners

The reflex is not uniquely American. The European Commission proposes an Industrial Accelerator Act that would reserve part of public procurement and support for vehicles meeting "Made in EU" requirements, with local assembly and European content thresholds. The stated goal is to reduce strategic dependencies in the face of Chinese competition.

But protection does not always distinguish adversary from ally. Honda, which stopped producing cars in the UK and Turkey in 2021, no longer manufactures in Europe. Its regional head says he has "no intention of leaving Europe" and rules out neither local production nor an industrial partnership, while hoping the final text will recognize Japan as a trusted partner. The nearly 59,000 registrations recorded over nine months remain insufficient, in his view, to justify a plant. European preference is at this stage a proposal, but it shows how anti-Chinese logic can weigh on an ally.

Coordination Mechanisms Under Strain

While supply chains secure themselves, consultation bodies show signs of wear. The G7 summit held online in early October, organized mainly by France after Donald Trump's pressure on Europeans over their reserves, took place without Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, represented by a deputy minister, nor British Prime Minister Andy Burnham. Two absences out of seven member countries: the Japanese opposition is chiefly exploiting explanations deemed contradictory between Takaichi, who cites a technical problem, and her minister Toshimitsu Motegi, who invokes a very short speaking slot.

On the American side, the fragility is internal. According to eight current and former officials, intelligence sharing on Iran and other threats has slowed, or even stopped at times, with Congress and between agencies. The CIA stopped last year co-drafting National Intelligence Council assessments, which devoted none to the war in Iran, even as the administration weighs resuming strikes after the midterm elections. This is not a rupture with allies, but a weakening of the raw material of any common decision.

Pyongyang and Beijing: Pressure That Bonds

The adverse context explains why these reflexes persist. North Korea fired about a dozen short-range ballistic missiles on October 29 during a drone-related demonstration, announced tests of dispersal warheads, then fired an unidentified projectile on November 4, against a backdrop of crisis with Seoul after a mine explosion at the border. Tokyo issued no alert, a sign that the immediate threat to Japan was not retained.

On the Beijing side, official discourse takes up the rhetoric of unity. The 2017 19th Congress report, reread by tianxia theorists, promises never to seek hegemony while asserting that no parcel of territory, Taiwan included, will be detached. This ambition of unity fuels the mistrust that motivates the securing of supplies.

Sanctions and Alliances: What the File Does Not Show

The brief invites identifying potential sanctions and alliances. Yet the file contains no announced sanctions nor any new pact. The closest instruments are economic and regulatory measures: Chinese export restrictions, the 2027 American sourcing rule and the projected European preference. The bomb alerts targeting seven flights and a cruise ship in Europe were neither claimed nor attributed. The nuances are numerous: the REalloys lease is non-binding and subject to financing and authorizations, the source describing it declares interests in the company, the ODNI assures it keeps its assessments close to historical trends, and the new intelligence director has resumed briefings on electoral threats.

Cohesion Through Exposure Rather Than Institutions

What the facts allow is limited but clear: Western security is played out first in industrial supply chains, with dated deadlines, while the G7 and intelligence show friction. Alliances will take shape less through new treaties than through access to protected markets and compliant sources. It remains to be seen whether European preferences will spare Japanese partners, and whether American supplies will keep their promises by 2027.

This article was written with the assistance of artificial intelligence and verified by our editorial team.