Seven-Year Blockade Lifted in Two Weeks

On October 20, Libya's eastern parliament unanimously approved a text it had rejected in 2020. Both Libyan camps now recognize a maritime border running between Crete and Cyprus. The Greek islands concerned are left without a continental shelf or exclusive economic zone beyond their territorial waters.

The trigger was political. On October 6, lawmakers ousted Aguila Saleh, a Cairo ally who had chaired the assembly for twelve years and refused to put the memorandum to a vote. His successor, Al-Salhin Abdelnabi al-Obeidi, headed the Libyan-Turkish friendship committee. In July, Ankara had already concluded an agreement with the Libyan National Army on military installations, surveillance and training.

A Ratification That Serves as Collateral

The key lies in the race for the presidency of a reunified Libya. Saddam Haftar is targeting the post, and the US plan to merge the governments would place him at the head of the Presidential Council, with Abdulhamid Dbeibah remaining Prime Minister in Tripoli. Yet Ankara has made no commitment to that plan, and its troops in the west of the country give it the means to make it fail.

For several analysts, including Jalel Harchaoui and Tarek Megerisi, the vote is therefore aimed at courting Turkish favor. Any unified government will inherit the text, while Turkey has publicly committed to nothing in return. Claudia Gazzini nonetheless recalls that Turkish support for Saddam Haftar is not guaranteed.

A Legal Lever, Not Yet an Energy One

On October 26, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and the European Union voiced their concern in a joint statement. The UN Secretary-General ruled that maritime arrangements incompatible with the Convention on the Law of the Sea should not be recognized. Recep Tayyip Erdogan responded that these objections had "no legitimate basis," since Turkey is not party to the Convention.

On the commercial front, the effect remains slim. Turkish company TPAO holds 40% of block O7, some 140 kilometers northwest of Benghazi, with Repsol as operator. Chevron holds four Greek blocks south of Crete, which the Turkish Defense Ministry says do not directly affect its continental shelf. Claudia Gazzini expects no investment from the majors in the disputed waters. What Turkey gains is a basis for contesting any project crossing the line. The SETA think tank locates the friction point east of the 26th degree of longitude, where a Turkish naval deployment could be triggered.

The Limits of the Maneuver

Egypt is losing influence in the East, but it is reacting. It is preparing a legal case and agreed with Athens on October 26 to advance on extending their 2020 maritime border toward Cyprus. Ankara says it is ready to talk. It is also seeking a similar agreement with Damascus, while Cyprus has signed delimitations with Egypt (2003), Israel (2010) and Lebanon (November 2025), but not with Syria.

Key Takeaways

Turkey has gained mandatory transit status rather than a resource. Its advantage will last if the US unification plan succeeds and if its opponents fail to counter it with a competing legal construct. Until then, the main risk is a naval incident.

This article was written with the assistance of artificial intelligence and verified by our editorial team.