A Storage Deficit That Changes the Nature of the Risk

Every EU member state must fill 80% of its gas storage capacity before winter. Germany has reached only about 61%, a gap of nearly 19 points. The figure weighs all the more heavily given that the country holds more than one-fifth of the EU's storage capacity and is its largest gas consumer. In September, industry association INES was already forecasting 77% at best by 1 November. Even that estimate proved too optimistic.

The risk is changing in nature. Full storage turns winter into a simple question of cost, whereas incomplete storage turns it into a question of physical availability. Germany will have to cover more of its peak demand with gas that arrives at the moment it is consumed.

Why the Market Did Not Fill the Caverns

A Disappointed Expectation of Peace

The mechanism is economic before it is political. Filling storage means buying gas at a price deemed acceptable. But the conflict between the United States and Iran, which opened in late February, sharply reduced traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which carried about one-fifth of global oil and gas. Many buyers waited for a deal that would bring prices down. They got the extension of QatarEnergy's force majeure on its LNG exports and the threat of escalation after the US midterm elections.

A Forward Curve That Does Not Reward Waiting

TTF contracts for December 2026, January 2027 and February 2027 all trade above EUR 100/MWh. Such a flat curve signals that operators expect neither a diplomatic breakthrough nor an influx of LNG in the short term. In this context, deferring purchases no longer offers an obvious gain, and the state may have to intervene. INES advocates a storage obligation imposed on suppliers, to be written into law without delay, and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs says it is open to the idea. Regulator Klaus Mueller, for his part, considers that hitting the targets is no longer essential and that LNG purchases during the winter would suffice, while acknowledging that prices have risen sharply.

What Physical Flows Show

Flow data at interconnection points give a picture of supply. On 30 October, the Emden EPT1 entry point, on the Norpipe side, recorded about 402.5 GWh per day. The VIP TTF-THE-H point, on the German-Dutch border, showed 482.9 GWh/d in and 180.8 GWh/d out. The Zeebrugge point, on the UK–Belgium interconnection, received 72.6 GWh/d.

Values for 31 October are markedly lower. Emden EPT1 falls to 77.6 GWh/d, about 80% less in a single day, and the exit flow at VIP Oberkappel (AT-DE) drops from 112.5 to 22.6 GWh/d, a decline of the same order. The entry value at Zevenaar (NL-DE) is missing, and many other points, such as Mallnow, Waidhaus or Baumgarten TAG, show zero.

It would be imprudent to read a supply disruption into this. Nearly identical drops at two distinct points suggest rather an incomplete day of data at the time of collection. Above all, these figures illustrate a reality: in a system where stocks no longer act as a buffer, every variation in flow matters more, and daily tracking of them becomes a vigilance indicator.

From Gas to Coal, Then to Electricity

Expensive gas feeds through to power generation. As early as September, analysts anticipated a roughly 25% rise in coal-fired generation in the EU over the six months to March 2027. Coal is becoming profitable again despite the carbon cost, which hits these plants hardest. But part of the fleet has been closed in the name of the transition, and one industry analyst noted that, even with gas at EUR 100/MWh, electricity could barely adjust further. Colder-than-usual temperatures are expected in Germany in the coming days, which intensifies the constraint, while winter offers little sun and wind.

Electricity prices on 30 October reflect this tension. Day-ahead settled at EUR 254.14/MWh in Switzerland, 250.85 in the Czech Republic and 250.56 in Denmark (DK-1 zone), and 211.19 in Portugal. Finland, at EUR 77.51/MWh, offers a stark contrast: it illustrates the gap between a system dependent on gas and coal and a less exposed market. This single-day snapshot says nothing about the trend, but it shows that the rise in gas prices is spreading beyond the gas market alone.

An Unstable Geopolitical Environment

Oil prices reflect the same uncertainty. Brent closed Monday at USD 104.77 a barrel, down 7.63%, before rebounding 0.5% to USD 105.25 in early Asian trading on Tuesday, following reports of US strikes targeting Iran's Qeshm island. The US president raises the possibility of a deal with Tehran, and Iran says its plan to reopen the strait could be implemented within two days if its conditions were met. These signals are contradictory, and it is precisely their uncertainty that keeps prices at these levels.

What Can Reasonably Be Concluded

The established facts are a 19-point deficit against the target, a TTF curve above EUR 100/MWh through February and high power prices in central Europe. They sketch a winter in which Germany must buy its gas at a steep price, at the moment it consumes it, with limited room to substitute coal given available capacity. The evidence does not allow us to assert that a physical shortage is likely, nor to measure precisely how prices have moved since summer. The regulator's thesis, that LNG purchases during the winter may suffice, remains plausible, but it assumes LNG is available, and that depends largely on how the conflict around Hormuz evolves. Until then, the trade-off remains between gas forced in at a high price and more coal, which Berlin would rather avoid.

This article was written with the assistance of artificial intelligence and verified by our editorial team.