Hormuz, Sahel, Indo-Pacific: the recomposition of power relations in three theaters

A restricted zone around the Strait of Hormuz, announced by Tehran after the expiration of an agreement with Washington, directly threatens the passage of nearly a fifth of the world's oil. At the same time, Niamey accuses Paris of having orchestrated an attempted coup d'état in late August, an allegation that France describes as «pure fiction».

Key points

Hormuz under tension. Iran intends to impose sanctions on ships entering a restricted zone whose contours remain unclear. The strait concentrates a structuring share of global oil traffic, and any restriction there produces an immediate leverage effect on prices. Brent stood at 96.02 dollars per barrel on September 1st, compared to 87.03 dollars the day before — a variation of nearly 10% in a single session, according to available data.

The Sahel in turmoil. The Nigerian government accuses France of having remotely controlled a mutiny involving soldiers who briefly took key positions before being brought under control. Paris categorically denies this. This sequence is part of a cycle of ruptures between Sahelian capitals and their former Western partners, with direct consequences for regional security arrangements.

The Indo-Pacific is structuring itself. The trajectory of the Quad between 2018 and 2024 illustrates a form of hybrid institutional balancing: middle powers diversifying their alignments without breaking with any major partner. This flexible architecture is becoming a model for other regions.

Proximity diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. The visit of the Israeli president to Cyprus on September 10th, his first since January 2025, signals an intensification of consultations on energy and security issues in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Civil society and public opinion. In Lisbon, a traveling exhibition featuring a bullet-riddled Ukrainian ambulance, installed near the Russian embassy, illustrates the war of narratives accompanying conflicts. In South Africa, violence during an anti-migrant demonstration reminds us that identity tensions remain a destabilizing factor.

Context

The Strait of Hormuz has for decades been the strategic passage point between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Previous incidents in 2019 — tanker sabotages and ship seizures — had already demonstrated the vulnerability of this corridor. In the Sahel, the rupture between Niger and France is part of a dynamic initiated after successive coups d'état in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, which have progressively pushed out Western forces in favor of other security partners. In the Indo-Pacific, the Quad rebuilt itself from 2017 around a logic of regional public goods rather than a formal alliance.

Key players

Tehran seeks to monetize its geographical control without triggering a direct military response: the restricted zone is a tool for graduated pressure, not a closure. Washington must arbitrate between firmness and the preservation of energy fluidity, as US jet fuel prices rose from 3.805 to 4.19 dollars per gallon between August 28th and September 1st. Paris, weakened in the Sahel, tries to contain a narrative of destabilization while maintaining its residual positions. The middle powers of the Indo-Pacific play the diversification card. Israel and Cyprus consolidate an Eastern Mediterranean energy axis.

Data and figures

Public indicators show upward pressure on hydrocarbons: Henry Hub natural gas rose from 2.82 to 2.90 dollars per million BTU between August 28th and September 1st. US regular gasoline followed a similar trajectory, from 3.742 to 3.443 dollars per gallon over the same period, with an intermediate peak at 3.863 dollars. Several weak signals of medium to high severity point to impacts on turbines, compressors, pumps, and industrial equipment, with a compliance schedule of one to five years. These elements suggest that industrial-maritime supply chains are already absorbing a geopolitical risk premium.

Analysis of issues

In the short term, the risk premium on maritime freight and insurance should widen if the Hormuz restricted zone materializes. Asian refiners, the first exposed, could activate more costly alternative routes. In the medium term, the acceleration of investments in renewable energies — several French regions show renewable production rates exceeding 50% — marginally reduces energy vulnerability, without eliminating it. In the Sahel, the eviction of Western partners opens space for other powers, with a risk of lasting security fragmentation.

An alternative reading deserves to be considered: the Iranian announcement could be more about negotiating posture than operational intent, with details remaining deliberately vague. Similarly, the Nigerian accusation could aim at internal use as much as a bilateral settling of scores. The concordance of signals does not guarantee the coherence of intentions.

Prospective hypotheses

Scenario 1 — Contained escalation (probability 50%). Iran maintains symbolic pressure without intercepting ships. Indicators to monitor: Brent evolution beyond 100 dollars, maritime insurance premiums in the Gulf.

Scenario 2 — Naval incident (probability 30%). A seizure or boarding triggers a limited American response. Indicators: aircraft carrier movements, Central Command communiqués.

Scenario 3 — Negotiated de-escalation (probability 20%). An interim agreement restores freedom of navigation. Indicators: resumption of talks, easing of futures prices.

Why it matters

These three theaters — Hormuz, Sahel, Indo-Pacific — are not separate issues: they depict a world where power is measured less by the possession of territories than by the ability to disrupt flows. For businesses, this means that the cost of geopolitical risk becomes a permanent budget line. For citizens, this translates into pump prices and more fragile supply chains. The question is no longer whether tensions will intensify, but which actors will be able to transform instability into strategic advantage.